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Summary  findings
Economists often characterize the regulation of  *  Evaluate whether lower costs than expected are the
monopolies as a "game" (between the regulator and the  result of better performance or diminished output.
service provider) in which the two players do not share  *  Properly evaluate the asset base and charge for the
the same information. The regulator is assumed to have  consumption of capital.
poorer  information than the service provider about the  Information that regulators get from private operators
scope of future efficiency gains and the size and timing of  of infrastructure monopolies should be used to make
future investment plans. Over time, the regulator must  both regulators and concessionaires accountable.
increase its information base so that regulatory targets  In Chile, for example, the privatization of monopolies
become more realistic - but this is a costly process.  led to significant efficiency gains, but it took a long time
Burns and Estache examine the ways such information  for these gains to be passed on to users because neither
can and should be generated,  especially through the  the firms nor the regulators were held accountable -
accounting requirements a regulator can impose on  until Congress expressed reluctance to endorse further
private operators  of infrastructure concessions. (They  privatization because earlier waves of privatization had
view concessioning and regulation as complementary,  not benefited consumers.
not substitute, activities.)  In other words, information should be used to make
Concessionaires should provide regulators with the  regulatory decisions more transparent  and to reduce the
information  they need to:  risk of the private providers "capturing" the regulators.
- Compare outcomes with expectations.
*  Evaluate the cost of adverse shocks that may
warrant relaxed regulation.
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1.  Introduction
The regulation of monopolies is often characterised by economists as a "game" between
the  regulator  and  the  service  provider  in  which  the  two  players  do  not  share  the  same
information.  The regulator is assumed to initially have poorer information regarding the scope
of future  efficiency gains, and  the size and timing of future investment plans  than the service
providers  themselves.  But the  regulator  can leam  more about  the efficiency of the private
operator  but  to be  successful at this, an  effective regulator  should  ensure  over  time  that  its
information  basis  increases,  and  that  its  ability to  process  that  information  effectively also
improves, so that regulatory targets will evolve to become more realistic.
However,  this is a costly process: the initial ineffectiveness of regulation  resulting from
information  gaps creates allocative inefficiencies but just  as importantly  carries political  and
social ramifications  which can endanger  the stability of the regulatory  regime.  In developing
countries,  this influences  the incentives to operate  efficiently and  the cost of investment  and
often ends up  threatening  the sustainability  of the increased  role of the private  sector in the
delivery of infrastructure services and ultimately, the foundations of the overall reform process
itself.
The various  ways  in  which  information  can and  should  be  generated,  in  particular
through  the accounting requirements a regulator can impose on the concessionaires is the main
focus  of  this  paper.  It  should  be  clear  that  this  paper  does  not  regard  concessioning  and
regulation  as substitute  activities.  For typical concessions of infrastructure  services of twenty
years  or more, it is inevitable  that  the expectations of the market  at the time of the bidding
process will differ from the outcomes. Regulatory reviews will be required  at periodic intervals
to adjust prices to reflect the underlying  cost structure of the business, in order to maintain the
business'  viability in the face of unfavourable  outcomes, and to share benefits with customers
when  the outcomes are better than expected. Consequently, the concessioning process should
be seen as a complement to future regulatory processes
The paper is  structured on the following lines. Section 2 summarises the basic objectives
that regulators  must be able to focus on, emphasising the need to encourage efficient behaviour
and some of the trade-offs they need to address. Section 3 describes how regulators typically set
tariffs in order to illustrate the onerous information requirements. Section 4 discusses the role of
information in some of the basic features  of contract design. This covers the information flows
that  should exist at the time of the concession - first from the government  or regulator  to the
bidders,  and  then from the bidders  to the government.  Section 5 draws  the analysis together
and  shows  how  the  information  can  be  used  at subsequent  regulatory  reviews.  Section  6
concludes.
2.  Information  and  choices  of regulatory  objectives
At the broadest level the regulatory objectives are to:
*  Protect customers' interests regarding prices and quality of service2
*  Ensure that the business, operating efficiently, can finance its activities
*  Promote efficiency
*  Fulfil obligations as decided initially by policymakers (such as a national uniform tariff)
*  Ensure that the regime is sustainable and robust
Most of these objectives are obvious,  but  that  of promotion  of efficiency reveals the
tensions at the heart of regulation. There are three aspects of efficiency that regulatory  regimes
should aim to promote: static productive efficiency, allocate efficiency and dynamic efficiency.
*  productivyihy  gains can be made from:
- improvements  in  the  performance  of  existing  assets.  For  generation  plant,  for
example,  this would  be in terms  of improved  availability,  thermal  efficiency and
flexibility of running;
- reduction  in manning  levels; and
- more  cost effective  procurement.
- allocatize  efficiency  gains can be made from cost reflective pricing
- dynamic  efficienciy  gains can be made from:
- the introduction of new technology; and
- rationalisation  of investment in new capacity.
Some regulatory  regimes may not satisfy all of these objectives. For example, a regime
that  focused  too  strongly  on  incentives  to  promote  allocative  efficiency  may  prejudice
productive  efficiency gains,  and  also  distort  investment  incentives.  On  the  other  hand,  a
regime  that  offered strong  profit  incentives to  improve  efficiency would  not  be  allocatively
efficient and  could  engender  popular  discontent  about  the conduct  of regulation.  This may
render the regulatory  system unstable, increasing  the risk of asset expropriation  by regulators,
resulting in a level of investment well below the needs.
If the regulator  had  complete information about the scope for efficiency improvements
and  the optimal  timing  and  level  of investment,  he  could  set  tariffs accordingly  and  there
would  be allocative, productive  and  dynamic  efficiency. However,  these conflicts and  trade-
offs exist because the regulator is ill-informed about both these costs. This lack of information is
the  may  reason  why  regulation  ends  up  striking  a  balance  between  the  three  efficiency
objectives.
The spectrum  of possible regulatory regimes ranges from very high powered  incentive
contracts (where the regulatory  rules give strong incentives for improved performance) to very
low-powered  regulatory  regimes  (where  incentives  on  the  concessionaire  to  improve
performance is low).  The regulatory and institutional ingredients  that make up a low powered
monopoly regime are:
1.  Bureaucratic,  rigid  and  intrusive  regulatory  structures  implying  a  lack  of
flexibility and adaptability.
2.  Complex and contradictory objectives devolved to management  by the regulator.3
3.  Prices  based  largely  on  the  firm's  own  costs,  implying  frequent  profits
confiscation (cost plus or rate of return).
Those which make up a high powered regime are:
1.  Managerial objectives are ring-fenced from public policy objectives, so that the
running  of the business is decentralised  to the managers,  within a well-defined
framework.
2.  Tariff controls  which  are  based  on  exogenous  information,  and  where  the
business is able to retain the profits of improved efficiency (price caps).
Two broad  characteristics therefore define the incentive power of a regulatory  regime
for monopoly businesses- the amount of control that is de-centralised to management; and how
far prices are decoupled from costs. The extent to which  the mechanism of regulation is high-
powered  or  low-powered  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  whether  regimes  are  likely  to  be
sustainable.  Low-powered regimes are not particularly  efficient, but the extent to which high-
powered  regimes are sustainable  enough  to deliver efficiency gains is an  important  question.
Starkey  and  van  Pelt  (1995) draw  attention  to  the  key  premise  underlying  high  powered
regimes which is that:
increased  profits  for the  firm will be vieWed  by regutlators  and their constituency  as something
other thtan  a  failure of regulation  itself  If thtis  premise  is false then tle regulators  will be under
constant  pressure  to recon  tract  whlten  tle firm reports  hzigher  profits.
The information requirement  that can be embodied in the concessioning processes may relieve
some  of  these  tensions,  but  first  we  consider  precisely  where  the  sources  of  information
asymmetry lie by considering how tariffs are typically set by a regulator.
3.  How much information  is needed  to set a tariff?
There  is  a  range  of  choices  of  regulatory  instrument  available  to  the  regulator  of
monopolies, and  as well as determining  the efficiency and  sustainability of the regime, these
choices have profound implications for the informational  burden  placed upon the regulator. In
this section we briefly describe the process by which the regulator sets tariffs at different points
in the spectrum of price control options. 1
3.1  Pure price control or Price Caps
Under this regime, the regulator sets (and re-sets) a CPI-X target from the existing price
level, where  X is the  regulator's  best  estimate  of future  productivity  growth.  This was the
These  regime  also  differ  along  other  dimensions.  Most  importantly  maybe  for  developing  countries  is that
they  imply  different  distributions  of risks between  the investors,  the govemment  and  the users.  Simplifying
somewhat,  the differences  can  be summarised  as  follows.  Under  price  caps,  risk  is bome  by the  investor,
under  the other  regimes,  risk  are shared  with either  the government  or with  the users.4
starting point for regulation in various sectors Argentina and in all sectors in the UK and offers
maximum incentives for the business to improve efficiency. This can be a light handed  form of
regulation--also  under  many of its  designs it can be as demanding  as the regimes discussed
below.  Under  a  very  simple  design  in  which  prices  of  the  various  products  are  capped
individually,  as in  gas or electricity in  Argentina, it simply require  the regulator  to forecast
future productivity  growth, and not  to adjust prices for past  excess profits.  The regulator can
look backwards  at the firm's  historic achievements, or can use comparative  information from
other  similar  businesses  (yardstick  competition).  Since  the  setting  of  this  type  of  control
requires only the most basic of checks to ensure that the profits resulting from the application
of the control are reasonable, this type of control may lead to sustainability problems described
above.
3.2  Price control with  frequent  adjustments  to ensure  that profits  are
normal  ex post
The guarantee  that ex-post profits reach certain levels is what  is achieved through  rate
of return regulation. This regime is representative of the US system as it evolved in the 1970s. It
gives  little incentive  to operators  to cut cost but  it has  the interesting  feature  of protecting
investors in risky environments  and may end up convincing some of them to bid for deals they
would  have not otherwise considered  given the levels of risks involved.  The problem is that
the information  requirements  are demanding,  and  in  order  to allow the regulators  to retain
control,  especially  over  investment  decisions,  this  regime  virtually  places  regulators  in  a
position to run the business. This confuses the roles of managers and regulators.
3.3  Price control which  attempts  to achieve,  ex ante,  a normal rate of
return for the firm2
Neither of the previous two models may provide the basis for a sustainable and efficient
model of regulation. An intermediate  scheme is one in which  regulators  attempt  to set prices
which recover an efficient level of costs, ex ante, but ex post, the firm is given incentives to beat
the control  because it will not  be reviewed  for a period  of time.  However,  when  the price
control  is  reviewed,  the  regulator  returns  the  benefits  of  efficiency  improvements  to  the
customer from then on.
Regulators proposing  this form of control use an accounting  approach  in which  asset
values, capital expenditure, depreciation  and operating  expenditure profiles are forecast, along
with  a cost of capital, in an attempt  to deliver, ex ante, a fair distribution  of returns  between
shareholders and customers. This broadly reflects UK regulation  as it has now evolved and is
served  as  a  model  in  Argentina  and  Brazil for  instance  where  the  main  implementation
problems centre around  the informational requirements.
2  For  a more  detailed description  of the exact steps that  have to be followed, see Green,  R. and M. Rodriguez-
Pardina,  "Resetting  Price Controls  for Privatizated  Utilities:  A Manual",  forthcoming  in 1998 EDI Technical
Paper.5
The remainder  of this section describes the informational  requirements  in some depth
To ensure that there is a fair division of gains between customers and shareholders, the targets
implicit in price controls need to be realistic and measurable. The first step for the regulator  is
to establish  the allowable revenue  of the business  on which  to  base a  price control. This is
required in order to be able to implement the specific control the reformers have selected. 3
3.3.1  The calculation  of allowable  revenue
There are two equivalent methods to calculate allowable revenue: the cashl  flou?  approach
and the traditional  accounting  based method.
In  the  more  traditional  accounting  based  method,  over  the  price  control  period,
revenues should be expected to cover:
1.  Operating costs; plus
2.  Depreciation; plus
3.  A return on capital
The cash-flow approach sets regulated revenues over a price control period equal to:
1.  the present value of operating and capital expenditures  over the period; plus
2.  the present value of the change in the asset value over the period.
The first of these components  ensures that the business can conduct its on-going activities; the
second  maintains  the  value  of existing  assets.  Any  expropriation  of  asset  value  is  made
transparent.  Box 1 illustrates how  this approach  was used  by the U.K. regulator  to calculate
transmission revenues to be earned by the National Grid Company.
3.3.2  The inputs  into the allowable  revenue  calculation
The inputs  into the allowable revenue calculation under either method are:
1.  Operating Costs
2.  Capital Expenditure
3.  An opening asset value
4.  Depreciation
5.  Cost of Capital
We will briefly review each of these in turn
3  The regulator can opt to set a control on price per unit sold, a control on revenue, or a hybrid of the two. For
multi-product  businesses, the regulator may set a price limit on a basket of prices and  products, or simply
set  an  average  revenue yield constraint.  A discussion of  the exact form  of the  price control, and  their
implications for economic efficiency is beyond the scope of this paper.6
Box 1: The Cash-flow approach used by Offer in the NGC price review
The table reports the calculation of transmission  revenues (severe case) to be earned by the National
Grid Company in Britain, made by the regulator in his 4th  Consultation Paper. The regulator eventually
based his price control on a slightly more lenient revenue allowance.
Calculation of transmission  business  revenues4
.1997/8  .1998/  .1999/0  200/1  *.  Total
................................................................  ............................................ _.
Operating Costs  . 350  .342  323  304
Capital Expenditure  194  155  154  213
Total  544  497  477  517
PV of outlays at 6.5%  527  452  408  414  1801
PV of asset values  .400  2971  1069
.......................................................  ..............................  ...... .......................................  .................. ,,  ,,,........i,..
PV of costs  2870
Unregulated Revenue  128  116  118  108
PVat6.5%  124  106  101  87  418
..  ........................................................................................  .............................  .....................................  ........................................................  ........................ ;...............
Regulated Revenue  735  705  677  650
.....................................................................--- .............................--  ...........................- !-------....................--'---'-'--"-''-"-'-t''''--'--"''''''-'-'-''--
PV of regulated revenue  712  641  578  521  2452
..................  ,. ..............  . ..........  ..  ................. . ............  - - - - .-- i-------.-----.--.-.-----..--..----i--------.-.-.
PVofrevenues  2870
The derivation of the closing value is shown below. The opening asset base of £4040m  is rolled forward
by expected capital expenditure less the allowed depreciation to obtain a closing value of f3823m. This
is discounted back to the present by dividing  by  (1+r)
4 where r is the regulator's  estimate of the
cost of capital (6.5%) and  raising to the fourth  power  reflects the fact that the control  lasts for four
years. The discounted closing value is therefore 3823/1.2865=2971.
Derivation of the asset value
i19997/8  1998/9  1999/2000  2000/1
Opening Value  4040  4007  3930  3849 ...................  .................................................  .......................................  ............................................... I........................................................
Depreciation  227  232  235  -239
........... i  ..... I.....  .... I..............I.......I.......................................................  ....  I............  ..................
Capital Expenditure  194  155  154  213
Closing Value  4007  3930  I 3849  3823
............................................................ I......  .............  ..........  ..........................  ......  ...........  .................
PV of Closing Value  4007  2971
4  The Transmission Price Control Review of the National  Grid  Company.  Offer 4th Consultation  Paper.
Offer: UK7
Operating  expenditure
The regulator needs to evaluate:
1.  the current levels of operating costs; and
2.  the efficient level of operating costs
Operating  expenditure forecasts may be based  on either exogenous information or firm-
specific  information  (either  historical  or  current).  Regulators  cannot  observe  directly  this
information and  may find  it difficult to build up  a reliable picture of firm-specific costs. The
financial components of the bidding documents will often cover some of this information but in
most developing  countries,  this models will have to be revised by the private  operators  once
they get a better idea of the value of the assets. It may be worth to point out hat if the regulator
uses firm-specific information based  on this models,  it may be tempting for the company  to
change some of the accounting outcomes to affect regulatory behaviour. This is why it is often
suggested  that using  exogenous  information  will provide  the regime with  sharper  incentive
properties.
In  Chile's  water  sector  or  in  Spain's  electricity sector,  model  companies  provide  a
benchmark to which the performance of actual companies  is compared. This model companies
take  into  account  technology,  asset  age  and  reasonable  operating  conditions.  Another
benchmark  can be obtained  through  the introduction  of yardstick  competition.  This can be  a
particularly  effective form of regulation  combining  firm-specific information with  exogenous
information.  Under this approach, a regulated business is regulated by reference to its actual --
rather  than  fictitious  -- peers,  thus,  if  all  firms  are  expected  to  achieve  the  same  rate  of
productivity  growth, then those firms which  do best, make the greatest profits, whilst  poorer
performers make lower profits.  Such a form of regulation is predicated on the assumption  that
a  sufficient number  of comparators  exist for each business  to be regulated  in this  way.  We
discuss yardstick competition in more detail in section 3.4.
Capital  expenditure
Expectations of the level and  speed  of future  capital  expenditure  are crucial in  such
capital intensive  businesses.  Whilst operating  productivity  trends  are reasonable  stable over
time,  capital expenditure  is  different.  Investment  is both  lumpy,  and  can be  postponed  or
brought  forward  by the operator.  Two major problems  emerge  - ex ante, how  is investment
forecast, and ex post, how does the regulator  deal with divergences between expected and  out-
turn capital expenditure at each review.
Engineers'  reports,  benchmarking  against  other  businesses  and  the  submission  of
business plans can assist in forecasting investment  requirements, but it is inevitable  that there
will  be  divergences  between  expectations  and  outcomes.  The  crucial  issue  in  providing
investment incentives is the treatment  of investment  over-or-under-spend  relative to forecasts
at each regulatory review.  We deal with this issue in section 3.3.3 below.8
Asset  valuation  and depreciation
This  has  proved  an  extremely  controversial  area,  especially  in  countries  where  the
privatisation  and  regulatory  experience  is  still  relatively  new.  Regulatory  asset  valuation
should be the fixed point of any regulatory system - the rules should be clear and transparent  in
order  to minimise the risk to shareholders  that  their investments  will be expropriated  by an
opportunistic  regulator.  The problem in privatised  businesses is that utility assets are usually
sold at a value which is quite different from (usually less than) the current cost (CC) valuation
of the assets used. The important  question is, do regulators  use the current  cost value of the
assets, or another  value which  reflects the price at which  the assets have been sold?  Where
possible, regulators have steered away from using current  cost values as a basis for regulation
and instead have derived a regulatory  value, based upon  the flotation value of the assets, and
then rolled  forward  by net investment.  The depreciation  profile reflects this  choice of asset
valuation,  for  it is  charged  on  the  regulatory,  rather  than  CC  value.  This  avoids  giving
investors a return on assets valued at a higher price by the regulator  than was actually paid by
investors.
For a concessionaire which has paid a transfer to the government  to operate a business
at a pre-determined  set of prices, these issues could be important.  Regulatory  disputes  could
emerge  regarding  what  the concessionaire  actually bought  with  that  transfer  - a  stream  of
future  earnings  or a  return  on the pre-existing  and  future  asset base.  Issues relating  to  the
depreciation profile of old as well as new assets therefore assume a particular  importance, and
should be signalled by the government  during  the bidding  process. Where the success criteria
for a bid is determined  by which rival can offer the lowest customer prices, then old assets are
explicitly written  down to zero, but there will still need to be regulatory  treatment  of any exit
payments to concessionaires for the value of underappreciated  assets. On the other hand,  if the
rivals bid a lump sum to run  a franchise,  then the outgoing  concessionaire could receive the
highest bid, since this reflects the value of the assets as they currently exist. However, this value
is based  upon  the future  stream  of earnings,  which  is  determined  by  the price  set  by  the
regulator  throughout  the forthcoming  franchise. If the regulator  unreasonably  ratchets  down
prices for the period of the new concession, then this effectively expropriates  the value of the
assets built in the previous concession. Generally, therefore, new investment undertaken  by the
concessionaire needs to be transparently  treated by the regulator  at each review, as part of the
process of rolling forward the asset base, and charging depreciation upon it.
Cost of capital
The cost of capital has  also been a contentious  issue in regulation.  It is necessary  to
compute  the weighted  average  cost of total  (debt plus  equity) capital  to provide  a return  to
investors and sustain  the asset base.  The cost of debt capital can be observed from published
information,  but  the  cost  of  equity  capital  needs  to  be  estimated  from  market  data  using
techniques such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
A particular  problem  quite  common in  developing  countries  is that  a concessionaire
may not be a listed company so that market data is not available. Another problem with market
based data is that it is part of a larger conglomerate, implying  that market data will include not9
only the regulated activity, but also the characteristics of the other activities the firm is involved
with.  In  most  recent  Latin  American  privatisations,  a  few  large  local groups  involved  in
multiple  activities would  join foreign investors  and  operators in a consortium  and  very little
information  on the infrastructure  segment  of their activities  can be  extracted  from the  local
stock markets.
These problems can be overcome through a number of alternatives. A common solution
is rely on close comparators.  Other domestic  or regional  companies quoted  locally or similar
international  companies  can  provide  useful  comparators  in  some  sectors  as  telecoms  for
instance where  private operators are common in many regions of the world. The alternative is
to use benchmark  ratios based on international  best practice. This information  is increasingly
available from various international organisations  or watchdogs in every sector.  For water, the
Asian Development  Bank and  the World Bank are for instance  putting  together  a  data base
which includes some data on the cost of capital. In telecoms and energy, many publications are
available on the market  that  generate this information. The quality  of the data  is not  always
ideal but it certainly provides a feeling for what  the international  experience is.  No solution is
of course perfect and in the end, a mixture of approaches, depending  on the types of problems
faced, is likely to provide an acceptable range for the allowed rate of return.
Box 2: How to compute the cost of capital?
The standard approach adopted by regulatory agencies and governments is to use the weighted average cost of
capital (WACC). Formally, WACC can be estimated by  :
WACC  =[(  - g)  x re]  + [g x rd,
where  g is the level of gearing/leverage in a company, i.e. the proportion of debt in the total capital structure
(i.e. debt + equity);  rdis the cost of debt finance. This is simply measured as risk free rate,  rf plus a  debt
premium over this rate,  p,.  The premium is either measured directly from the yield of a company's bond or
through comparator information -yields  on new bonds are listed in the Financial Times at the date of issuance
and are available from commercial information sources on a daily basis-- and  re is the cost of equity finance;
its estimation raises bigger problems and yet for privatised infrastructure monopolies, it is quite important
since access to debt finance can be quite restricted for many developing countries privatisation projects. One of
the common approaches adopted to measuring the cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
This estimates the cost of equity as .
re = rf  +/c(rm  -rf)
where: re is the cost of equity finance;  rf is the risk-free return;  De  is the equity beta which measures the
relative riskiness of the company's equity (and sometimes the sector's riskiness) compared to the market as a
whole; its value depends on the type of regulation used;  rm  is the level of market return; and  rm - rf  is the
market risk premium. Establishing the values for each of these items is relatively straight-forward when
developed capital markets exist and companies are quoted on a stock exchange.
Approximations have to be used in most less developed countries. The average asset beta in infrastructure
(which accounts fro the leverage in the capital structure of the projects) is around 0.7 for high powered
incentive regimes and around 0.3 for low powered incentive regimes.
Note: for quick review of how to estimate this cost of capital, see Alexander, I and A. Estache (1997),  'A back-of- the-  envelope
approach  to assess  the cost of capital  for network  regulators",  mimeo,  The World  Bank, December;  for a more detailed  analysis,  see Alexander,  1,
C. Mayer  and H.Weeds  (1996),  Regulatory  Structure  and Risk in Infrastructure  Firms:  An Intemational  Comparison",  Policy  Research  Working
Paper 1698.  World  Bank10
3.3.3  Re-setting  price controls  and the treatment of capital expenditure
The price control will periodically need to be reset. It is preferable to specify this period
ex ante to  preserve  incentives  in  the  absence  of  profit  sharing  mechanisms  built  into  the
formula. Prices may be reset by moving the regulated price level to the prevailing level of costs
(through a so-called Po  cut), and thereafter a new X factor would apply.  Thus, companies keep
the profits from extraordinary  or unanticipated  efficiency improvements  for up  to five years,
when the gains are transferred  to customers through  lower prices.  Alternatively, the regulator
could choose not  to impose a PO  cut and  instead  set  the X factor  so that expected  economic
profits are zero at the end of the period rather  than throughout  the period, thus allowing  the
company to enjoy the profits  of its efficiency gains for rather  longer. In either  case, a kind  of
inter-temporal profit sharing system operates.
During  the price control  period, however,  the treatment  of capital  expenditure  poses
some rather  difficult questions. Investment  can be postponed  or even cancelled-often  because
demand is overestimated  by the bidders  on a new concession based on the information  made
available by  the  governments  because  typically  public  enterprises  have  very  little  relevant
information on demand.  It is also often lumpy rather than occurring uniformly over a number
of  years,  and  the  assets  invested  in  are  long-lived.  This  makes  forecasting  investment
extremely difficult for regulators  and it is almost inevitable  they will make errors in the early
years of concessions.  Indeed, having made that forecast,  the incentive is on the firm to pass the
cash that would have been used for investment to shareholders,  thus boosting the value of the
business.  For  example,  in  the  UK,  the  Northern  Ireland  Electricity  spent  £50m  less  on
investment than was anticipated at the time of privatisation.
However, the regulatory  treatment  of this problem has implications for the incentive to
invest. When the regulatory  asset base is updated  from one price review to the next there is an
issue of whether the ex ante or ex post data is used. The choice of value has implications for the
level of incentives for the company  to undertake  the investment  at a  lower  price  than  that
forecast. These  incentives  are  summarised  in  Table  1. It  shows  that  the  decision  between
whether to use ex ante or ex post data, or a possible compromise between the two which  might
allow efficiency savings to be kept for a maximum of 10 years rather  than five5, depends  on a
number of factors. These include:
*  the overall importance of the investment program;
*  the expected level of efficiency savings; and
*  the ability of the regulatory  body  to establish the efficient level of investment  for the
company.
5  This is the system that is being put in place in the water industry in England & Wales.11
Approach  IPositive incentives  INegative incentives .....................  ........  ....  .......  ..  ..........................................................  .......................................................................
Ex ante  . Since savings are kept  forever there is  *  There is an incentive to quote high prices for
the  maximum incentive to push  the  actual  investment to maximise the savings. This makes
valuation  . cost of investment down as low as possible.  intrusive regulation more necessary.
. There  is  an  incentive  to  delay  those  I
projects that should be delayed
...............  .................................................................  .................................................................
Ex post  . There  is  an  incentive  to  undertake  *  Small  efficiency  gains  may  not  besought
investment as cheaply as  possible since the  after  if the  additional  return  to  the  company is
valuation  gain is kept for a maximum of five years.  minimal.
Efficiency savings are only kept for the  *  The  incentive  to  delay  investments  is
lifetime of the project and  so there is a bias  minimised  which  may  lead  to  unnecessary
to  undertaking  investment  early  in  the  investment being undertaken.
control  period  which  may  be  quite  good
when  the  need  to expand  coverage  fast  is
.important.
Clawback of capital investment  under-spend
An important  concern in developing/reforming  countries  where  one the main reasons
for privatisation  is to attract private  investment  to meet the pressing  needs to expand  service
coverage is the risk that these investors will face incentives to under-invest.  In Argentina's  toll
road  concession program,  one  of the  major  issues  was  that  investment  has  been from  the
beginning behind  schedule. This issue is in fact also relevant is some developed  countries.  It
was recently debated  in the UK by the Monopolies and  Mergers Commission with  respect to
the price review of Northern  Ireland  Electricity (NIE) by regulator  and  the debate provides  a
useful conceptualisation of the problem.
The issue at stake was whether  under-spend  on investment  should be clawed back. In
principle  clawing  back  unspent  money  goes  against  the  philosophy  of  incentive  based
regulation - this should be seen as being different to employing ex post investment figures in the
updating  of the regulatory  asset base since the incentive  to be efficient is not affected by this
decision. The first step is to understand  the reasons for underinvestment.
There  are  three  possible  reasons  why  a  company  would  under-spend  on  capital
expenditure (or even operating expenditure):
*  owing  to unanticipated  efficiency savings  the  money  was  not  needed  (except as an
incentive to be more efficient);
*  the expenditure was delayed for a variety of reasons that may not be equally valid, or
*  the company was successful at fooling the regulatory body as to the level of expenditure
that was required.12
The first reason  is entirely acceptable to justify the existence of underspend.  The final
reason, while not acceptable, is the fault of the regulatory  body  (or its design) and  so is to an
extent part of a learning process that should be accepted but definitely not repeated.  It should
tell the regulator that some rules and processes need to be clarified.
The second explanation is more subtle. It can be interpreted  in two ways:
*  capital expenditure was not undertaken  because it was possible to delay the project and
achieve the desired output from a cheaper alternative; or
*  capital  expenditure  was  not  undertaken  because  the  company  simply  did  not  get
around to it.
The first of these options is an acceptable efficiency saving while the second is unacceptable. It
was  the  latter  reason  that  NIE  put  forward  for  some  of  its  under-spend  on  capital
expenditure-or,  at least, the fact that management  were distracted from investing by the need
to  concentrate  on the privatisation  of the company.  Since the under-spend  was in  excess of
£50m both Ofreg, the regulator,  and the MMC decided  that some clawback of this money was
required, especially as it was unclear whether NIE had included  the delayed projects in its new
capital expenditure forecast.
Clawing back money does, however, create perverse incentives for companies. If there is
an expectation of unspent  money being clawed back, companies will ensure that they spend all
that  they  are forecast to,  so removing  the incentive  to become  efficient. There are ways  of
overcoming  this  which  are  primarily  concemed  with  the  establishment  of  unanticipated
efficiency savings.  Work is being  developed  on how  companies  should  report  their annual
investment  out-tum  figures  to  provide  the  regulatory  body  with  sufficient  information  to
determine the levels, and possibly the causes, of unanticipated  savings.
While this approach  may seem intrusive,  the point being made  in this  section is that
there  is a trade-off between  allowing companies  to keep what  may be significant amounts of
under-spend,  creating  perverse  incentives  through  arbitrary  claw-back,  requiring  intrusive
regulation at the price review, or requiring  annual reporting.  Once more the core issue is the
design of the information needed to support effective and fair decisions by the regulators.
3.4  Yardstick  Competition
Under yardstick competition,  the price charged by a regional monopolist is determined
by  the costs of the other regional  monopolists.  Assuming  that  the businesses  are perfectly
comparable, then setting prices for each business at the average  level of costs in the industry
gives strong incentives for businesses  to reduce their costs, which  obviously has the effect of
reducing  costs and  prices in  the  industry  as  a whole.  If businesses  differ in  some  respects
(because of their  geographical  or topological  characteristics), but  the  manner  in  which  they
differ can be unambiguously  identified,  then  the regulator  may simply  adjust the prices for
each business by the extent of the costs which are outside their control.13
If the extent to which  the costs of firms differs due  to inefficiency and  due  to factors
beyond  their  control  cannot  be  separately  identified  with  certainty,  then  measurement
problems  enter into a yardstick regime. In this case, particular  econometric techniques need to
be used  to separate  inefficiency from  factors beyond  the firms'  control.  The measurement  of
efficiency  in  this  context  is  not  a  trivial  task.  The  two  principle  methods  to  measure
productivity  and efficiency are to estimate the cost function of the businesses using econometric
techniques,  or to use mathematical programming  techniques to measure the movement of the
production  function  over  time.  Bums  and  Weyman-Jones  (1994,1996) employed  both
methodologies  to  obtain  efficiency and  productivity  estimates  in  the  England  and  Wales
electricity distribution business.
However, these models cannot precisely measure relative efficiency because the simple
representations  of firm behaviour  are  only  approximations  to the  true  cost function  of the
business.  The data  simply do not  exist to identify  all the firm-specific characteristics  of the
activity being considered, and therefore it is very difficult to decompose efficiency (over which
the firm has control) and factors which  cause the incurrence of costs, but  over which the firm
has no control. Thus, it may not be possible  to adopt a strong form  of yardstick  competition
when businesses are heterogeneous  in their characteristics.
This does not mean that these approaches  are useless, it simply means that it will take
time before the investment in good data payoffs. The Australian government  has undertaken  a
series of international benchmarking overviews which compares the performance of Australia's
infrastructure  performance to those of the rest of the world. In that context it has developed  a
series of data bases which can be consulted by any regulator  in the world. Australia's  Industry
Commission  has  a  site  on  the  Internet  and  all  of  its  data  can  help  any  regulator  a  first
comparative  look. This is not sufficient however  and  more formal techniques  are essential in
order  to obtain meaningful comparisons.
To get a handle and accept the use of the more technical approaches, a few facts may be
have to be appreciated.  It is important to recognise for instance that if the factors outside of the
control  of  the  business  are  stable over  time,  then  estimates  of productivity  over  time  will
generally be reasonably robust.  It is then legitimate to argue that although  the regulator  does
not know the efficient level of costs, econometric and data envelope analysis should enable him
to gain a reliable estimate of the rate of productivity growth that the firm should be able to attain.
On that basis, the regulator can adopt a weaker form of yardstick competition, which is to set a
price reduction  target  that is equal for all businesses, on the grounds  that whatever  level of
prices and  costs comprise the starting  point, all the businesses should  be able to achieve the
same rate of reduction  in prices without  encountering  financial difficulties. This appears to be
the position  of the  UK electricity regulator,  who has  constructed  the price control  such that
since privatisation,  all the distributors in England  and Wales have been required  to achieve an
annual  average  real reduction  in  prices of around  3% per  year. This is despite  the fact that
distributors  have achieved quite  different productivity  growth  since privatisation,  as Table 2
illustrates.  However,  this  is  likely  to  be  due  to  differences  in  the  timing  of  efficiency14
improvements  rather  than  any  differences in  the inherent  ability of most  of the  business  to
achieve the same levels of productivity  growth in the medium  term. 6
Table 2: Productivity growth amongst distributors in England and Wales, 1971-1993  (%  p.a.)
Company  . 1971-1993  1971-1990  1991-1993
................................................................................  .................................................  .............................................................  .........................................  ..............................................
London  4.2  4.2  4.5
................................................................................  .......................................................  ......................................................................
Seeboard  2.8  2.7  3-9
Southern  3.6  3.6  I 3.6
..........................................................................  ........................................  .......................................  ........................................
SouthWest  2.1  2.2  1.2
...........................................................................  .........................................  ............................................  ..............................
SouthWales  2.7  2.2  6.1
Manweb  3.2  2.5  7.8
................................................................................  ..................................................................................  r-..............  r...........-.......-.....  r  ........
Eastern  3.8  2.5  11.7
................................................................................  ......................................................  ................................................ l"..........  ........... I.............I.............
East Midlands  2.2  2.4  2.0
Norweb  2.2  2.2  2.2
........... I....................................................................  ........................................................  ..........................................................  .................................................................... 
Yorkshire  2.1  2.1  1.7
Northem  2.3  2.4  16
Industry  Average  2.2  . 1.9  4.5
Source: P. Burns  and T.G. Weyman-Jones (1994) TILe  Performnance  of the Electricity  Distribution  Business in  England  and Wales, 1971-
1993. CRI Discussion paper No. 8. Cipfa: UK
4.  Generating  information  while  designing  a concession
In addition  to ensuring  that it meets the main fiscal and other economic objectives assigned to
the privatisation  process, the design of the concession rules should:
*  Attract a sufficient number of bidders to facilitate a competitive process;
...but also....
*  Facilitate  the  provision  of sufficient  information  by  the  authorities  to  reduce  both
market and regulatory risk and
6  Similar  applied  research  on yardstick  competition  is currently  under  way in Brazil for the water  sector.  See
for  a  rough  draft,  Crampes,  Diette  and  Estache  (1997),  "What  could  regulators  learn  from  yardstick
competition?  Lessons  for  Brazil's  water  and  sanitation  sector",  mimeo,  The World  Bank,  currently  being
significantly  improved  by the Planning  Ministry  in Brazil.15
*  Extract sufficient information  from the bidders  which can be used  at future regulatory
reviews.
These objectives are  interactive: the number of bidders  is important to ensure the generation of
information  is adequate.  It is however  important  to recognise that information  generation is a
two  way  street  and  that  the  government  needs  to provide  enough  relevant  information  is
provider to the potential bidders  to ensure the success of the concessioning strategy.
4.1  The number  of bidders
The  larger  the  number  of  bidders,  the  better  the  chances  of  generating  useful
information  for  the  regulators  of  the  eventual  winning  monopoly.  More  data  becomes
available, comparisons of the various evaluations of the business can provide some robustness
to the initial information  the regulators  will have to get ready for price revisions and  conflict
resolutions. The experience in developing  and  reforming countries  suggest however  that  this
source of information is not as effective as it sounds
In certain circumstances there may not be intense competition for concessions. Consider
the experience of the transport  sector in reforming and  developing  economies. The number of
bidders  in  all  transport  concessions  in  Latin  America  have  tended  to  be  quite  small.  In
Argentina,  one  of the  reasons  was  the  requirement  that  foreign investors  had  to join local
partners in a consortium to be eligible to bid and they were not that many local partners to pick
from. In Brazil, the government  wanted  to avoid a strong  monopoly  and  imposed an  upper
limit of 20% of shares allowed for any single company in the bidding consortium. This forced
many of the potential  companies  to work  together  and  hence reduced  the number  of actual
bidders.  In transport  privatisations  in  Eastern  Europe, the  limited  number  of bidders  were
explained by different factors--which are in fact quite common to all infrastructure privatisation
in particular  in Africa and  some of the poorest  regions of Latin America. When a  project is
relatively small, the transactions costs of putting  together  a bid are large, or if the project has
sometimes  been  perceived  to  be risky  because  of the broader  political,  economic and  legal
environment.  In such situations  it may sometimes  be preferable for authorities  to negotiate a
concession with operators chosen on the basis of their international experience.
Bidding processes may be also be unrealistic if particular  clauses in the draft concession
foreclose the process  to  potential  bidders.  For example,  the  Bulgarian  government  recently
planned  to  award  a  concession  for  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  gas  pipeline  and
construction of a new pipeline for the transit of Russian gas both direct to the Bulgarian market
and through Bulgaria to the Balkans and Turkey. A clause in the draft concession required  that
the concessionaire had  to be able to guarantee  the delivery  of Russian, and consequently  the
market was foreclosed to all bidders except the consortium associated with Gazprom. Although
one  option would  have  been to  drop  the clause and  treat  the sale of gas by Gazprom  as  a
separate issue to the construction of the pipeline, it was decided to abandon the tender process
in favour of direct negotiations with Gazprom.
A bidding process may favour particular players over others. For example, Trinidad and
Tobago (T&T)  utilities policy required a rapid introduction  of private sector participation in the
water sector, but the information that could be provided  to bidders was sparse - there were no
audit reports, no least cost expansion plans or demand forecasts. Therefore T&T adopted a two-16
stage process,  whereby  a  3 year  interim  operating  agreement  (IOA) would  be  awarded  to
operate the system and to gather information and data on the business and its prospects, which
would  form  the basis  for the  tender  for  the Permanent  Operating  Agreement  (POA). This
clearly puts  the Interim Operator  at a distinct advantage  in a tender  for the POA, but  on the
other hand,  the experience gained by the interim operator has value, so to exclude it from the
bid for the POA carries a cost. Consequently, T&T decided  to abandon the tender for the POA
and negotiate directly with the interim operator for the POA.
So there  do  exist a  number  of reasons  why  a  competitive  bidding  process  may  be
unfeasible. However, when the competition of the bidding  process is removed, it is all the more
important  for the authorities to elicit as much information from the potential concessionaire as
possible  through  the  negotiation  process.  The information  flows  however  have  to  be  bi-
directional. They have to flow from the government  to the bidders  first in order  to make sure
that  the government  can  make the  most of the information  that  will then have  to flow  the
bidders to the government and eventually the regulator.
4.2 Information  flows from the government  to the bidders
The information  provided  by  the  authorities  to  bidders  at  the  time  of  the bidding
process should include the following:
*  The process and the success criteria
*  The duration of the contract
*  The scope of the contract - operational or investment
*  The regulatory framework that will apply
*  The targets for the outputs  (including quality)
*  The information to be received from bidders
This information is required by bidders  so that the rivals can form a reasonable  set of
expectations about the future shape of the business and its costs. If there is uncertainty relating
to the regulatory framework, or the nature of the targets, for example, then this is a risk for the
bidders  that will be reflected in the bids.
4.2.1  The process  and  the  success  criteria,
Although  there  are  multiple  variants,  most  concessioning  processes  normally  have
broad  three  stages: first,  there  is  a  pre-qualification  assessment.  Prior  to  the  tender  being
formally opened, the authorities define the minimum requirements  that bidders should comply
with,  such as relevant  experience as a utility  business, financial ability with  experience and
resources to invest in and operate the system.
Next, a number of groups are invited to bid to run the system. The technical submission
covers  a  wealth  of information  and  it is  in  making  the  information  requests  that  fill  the
technical bid, that the process will have a significant impact on future regulation. The technical
bid will contain engineering reports that reveal how the bidder intends  to meet the targets set17
down in the draft concession. The technical bid will also contain financial information relating
to expected operating  and  capital expenditure  which we  discuss in section 4.3. Finally, each
rival submits  a bid to run the system, which can be either the amount they are willing to pay to
operate  the system, or the price they would be willing to charge to customers.
4.2.2  The  duration  of the contract
Some  of  the  most  extreme  defenders  of competition  for  the  market  (the 'Chicago'
school) suggests that the process should be repeated frequently, and the concession given to the
bidder that offers to supply on the best terms, thereby allowing the regulator  to select the most
efficient  supplier  at  any  point  in  time.  Two  objections  are  usually  raised-  first  that  the
incumbent has an advantage  over other bidders, but  also that the incumbent  has incentives to
invest less than the social optimum because the bidding process will treat all past investment as
sunk. Consequently,  where  little investment  is required,  the contract length  can be  short  to
promote  productive  and  allocative efficiency, but  where  major investment  programmes  are
required, the contract length needs to be longer to promote efficient investment behaviour.
The actual importance  of the contract duration  is most obvious in the recent wave of
contract renegotiations  in transport in Latin America. Whether in Argentina or in Mexico, one
of the key aspects of the renegotiation  has been the duration  of the contract. Many operators
want  more time to recover their investments--i.e. longer amortisation periods-- so that they can
allow for lower and  hence politically more viable prices for their services. It is also one of the
options being considered in the renegotiation  of the Buenos Aires Water Concession. In fact, in
many  of  these  early  contracts,  it  is becoming  apparent  that  the  risk  of  not  extending  the
contracts to adjust to the new information generated by the private operation  of the service will
be  either  that  investment  plans  will not  be  met or that  investment  quality  may have  to be
adjusted downward.
4.2.3  The  scope  of the  contract
When major investment programmes  are a feature of utility businesses and there is little
room  for  adjustments  in  the  concession  duration,  one  option  is  to  consider  splitting  off
investment  and operations. In France it is increasingly common practice for local authorities to
retain control of long term investment but to auction affermage contracts to operate the system
and undertake  shorter term investments.
Whilst  the system  does not work  badly in  France there  are two  drawbacks  with  this
approach.  The first is that private  finance does not fund the investment  programme,  which is
one of the reasons why governments wish to award concessions in the first place. The second is
that unless the framework of controls is properly established, such a split between investments
and  operations  could create perverse incentives. An example of this is water concessioning in
Guinea. The concessionaire (SEEG)  is responsible for maintenance  and the state owned water
company  (SONAG) is responsible for investment.  The concessionaire can increase profits by
reducing  its  maintenance  expenditure,  leading  to a faster deterioration  in  the quality  of the
network  and an increased need for new investment.18
The  only  way  around  the  problem  is  to  maintain  a  detailed  asset  inventory  and
rehabilitation  schedule  and  again  this  information  need  to  be  spelled  out  ex-ante  in  the
contract.
4.2.4  The output  targets
The authorities  should  clearly  define  the  output  targets  required  to  be  met  by  the
concessionaire. The targets will vary across industries  and  over time. Targets for a water and
sewerage concession will cover:
*  Coverage of the network;
*  Requirement to offer a continuous water supply;
*  Improvements to the network
*  Drinking water quality standards;
*  Environmental standards;
*  Service quality standards; and
*  Penalties for non-performance
For electricity, targets will cover
*  Connection to the system;
*  Electrification programmes;
*  Quality, such as number and frequency of interruptions;
*  Environmental control of emissions (for concessions to operate power stations); and
*  Safety standards
The concession should specify the time-frame over which the targets are to be met, with
penalties  for non-compliance  in  particular  cases.  In  setting  the  targets,  the  regulator  must
decide the appropriate  mechanism of regulation  as well as the appropriate  level of the target.
Some targets may take the form of a command  and control, whilst others will be decentralised
to the business within a framework of penalties and  rewards. Whilst mechanisms  may vary, it
is  vital  that  quality  is  regulated,  since  under  an  incentive  contract  without  any  quality
standards,  quality can be diminished  in order to reduce costs.
4.2.5  The Regulatory  Framework
In designing  the regulatory  framework  it is important  to identify  to concessionaires
what  falls under  legislation,  the Articles of the Concession,  the regulator's  control,  and  the
remit of any appellant bodies. If regulation was entirely rules based there would be no need for
a regulator  - the rules would  be  enshrined  in law  or in the concession. However,  regulators
exist because  events  occur which  require  the  regulator  to  act with  discretion.  However,  if
regulators have too much discretion  then bidders  will price regulatory  risk into their bids, so
consequently,  regulators  should  exercise  discretion  but  within  a  well  understood  and
transparent framework.19
The key concerns of regulated businesses are whether their assets will be expropriated,
whether changes in exogenous factors are recognised by the regulator; and how long they are
able to  keep  the benefits  of efficiency improvements.  It is, of course,  impossible  to write  a
complete  regulatory  or  concession  contract  which  covers  every  eventuality  because  the
monitoring  and enforcement  of the contract would  be costly and encourage  game playing by
the concessionaire. Consequently, it is inevitable that a number of aspects will be resolved over
the course  of the concession. However,  it is important  that  the information  provided  by the
government  gives clear signals  to the bidders  on the set of principles  that will apply  to the
resolution of these issues.
As far  as the treatment  of investment  is concerned,  the regulatory  framework  should
clearly signal the principles  underlying  regulatory  asset valuation  and  depreciation  policy. If
there is a risk that  assets will be expropriated  ex post,  then incentives to undertake  the right
amount of investment will be diminished. Consequently,  the policy on asset valuation must be
well established,  but  perhaps  the most effective way  of reducing  risk on both  sides - for the
government in realising that insufficient investment has been undertaken,  and for the company
concerned  about expropriation,  is to profile the expenditure  programme  so that the bulk of it
occurs towards  the middle  of the franchise - this would allow the business to raise cash in the
early years  of the franchise, but  would  allow the regulator  to observe  the effectiveness with
which that cash was spent on investment.
For example, the concession for the Manila Water franchises stipulated the principles of
re-basing of price to cost at each review. If prices were below cost by the time of each review,
then prices would  be adjusted upwards  immediately, whereas  if prices are above costs, then a
glide-path  would  be  put  in  place  so that  prices would  fall to cost over  time. This provides
financial  safeguards  to the concessionaire, whilst  at the same time  gives incentives to  make
efficiency improvements  through  being  able to  keep  the profits  of those  improvements  for
longer. An important  issue, however,  is the appropriate  definition of cost, in order that prices
rising to costs does not reward  inefficiency - to establish this requires the provision of relevant
information during the bidding process as discussed later
Bidders  will  also  need  to  be  assured  that  the  principles  of  regulation  established
throughout  the  process will  protect  the concessionaire  from  certain  unforeseen  shocks and
events such as changes in the law that effect the business, amendments  to service obligations,
and so on.  The process should clearly establish the reporting requirements on the business - the
extent to which it is ring-fenced from other activities it may be involved in, and the regulatory
accounts for each business. It should also be made clear that the regulatory framework will take
account  of the output  targets  achieved or not  by the concessionaire - examples  of these are
given in the next section. The purpose  of giving signals  at the outset is to eliminate as much
regulatory  risk as possible  in order  that bidders  do not build a significant risk premium  into
their bid, causing higher prices/lower  bids than would otherwise be the case.
4.3  Information  flows from the bidders  to the government
In the previous  section we described  the range of information that is required  to flow
from  the government  or regulator  to the bidders  at  the time  of the  concession in  order  to
mitigate many of the regulatory  risks that could result in higher prices/lower  bids than would20
otherwise be the case. In this section we draw attention  to the concerns of the regulator  that it
does not wish to be duped by the concessionaire at each regulatory review.
Ideally,  the  regulator  would  wish  the  bidding  process  to  reveal  each  bidders
expectations  of the  future  in  order  that  they can be  benchmarked  against  outcomes.  If the
outcomes are the same as the expectation, then good  information provided  at the time of the
bid will prove that this has been the case, and will enable the regulator  to resist any demands
by the business to relax the regulatory regime.
If, on the other hand,  the outcomes are different to expectations, then the information
provided will enable the regulator to act reasonably to change the regulatory parameters within
the  framework  of  regulation  laid  down.  The  regulator  should  therefore  request  from  the
bidders  all  the  information  that  any  sensible  business  would  itself  make  use  of  before
comrnitting itself to a 25 year investment.
Consequently,  the government  should  request  from the bidders,  for each year of the
concession:
1.  volume forecasts by customer type
2.  number of customer connections by customer type
3.  the cost of connection
4.  disaggregated operating cost information
5.  disaggregated investment information
6.  key financial ratios
7.  sensitivity analyses
Since the costs will be commensurate  with  the regulatory  targets  and  with  the bidders  own
expectations of volumes and connections, relevant information should  also be forthcoming  on
cost estimates under altemative  volume scenarios.  The  cost  information  should  be  as
disaggregated  as  possible.  The  Ofwat  regulatory  accounting  guidelines  (RAGs) provide  a
benchmark  of good regulatory practice. 7 These 5 RAGs deal with:
1.  Accounting for current costs
2.  Classification of infrastructure expenditure
3.  Contents of regulatory accounts
4.  Analysis of operating costs and assets
5.  Transfer pricing between businesses
RAG 4 is particularly  useful  as a potential  model for other regulators.  It distinguishes
between 5 business activities and 3 service activities. The service activities are: water resources
7  They can  easily be requested  from  OFWAT and  are  worth  going  through,  considering  that  they  are
probably more of an upper limit on what a regulator can ask for rather than strict model or benchmark.21
and treatment, water distribution, sewerage, sewage treatment and sludge treatment whilst the
business  activities  are:  customer  services,  scientific  services  and  costs  of  regulation.  The
separation  of these activities allows a clear identification of the various profit and cost centres,
including the cost of complying with regulatory demands.
Pro-forma  accounts  for each business,  including  standards  for the allocation  of fixed
and common costs, attempt to extract relevant comparative information from all the businesses
to be used at regulatory reviews. These accounts cover not only operating costs but also existing
assets  and  investment  to  a  disaggregated  extent.  In  England  and  Wales, these are used  to
facilitate ongoing  regulation - in a franchising  context, these accounts represent  the bidders'
expectations  of  their  future  set  of  accounts,  against  which  their  actual  accounts  can  be
compared.
Of  particular  importance  is  the  treatment  of  ongoing  investment,  and  again,  the
information  received in the pro-forma  accounts that the business expects to fill in can also be
compared  to the actual accounts. The purpose  of this information is to be able to evaluate the
financial implications of any unforeseen events that the business should  be protected from, but
also,  to  properly  account  for  any  sharing  of  out-performance  between  the  firm  and  the
regulator.
Finally, the  regulators  should  also  obtain  financial  information  from  the bidders  to
evaluate  their  financial  soundness  throughout  the  course  of  the  concession.  The  cost
information  they  provide,  together  with  the  turnover  information  should  be  unified  in  a
financial model to provide forecasts of:
1.  the debt profile, both short-term and long-term debt
2.  Liquidity
3.  Dividend policy
4.  Targeted minimum rate of return
5.  Equity rate of return
6.  Interest cover
7.  Debt-equity ratio
To summarise, the array of financial investment can therefore be used:
1.  To compare outcomes to expectations;
2.  To evaluate  the cost  of adverse  shocks that  may  warrant  a relaxation  of the
regulatory regime;
3.  To evaluate whether  lower costs than expected is due  to better  performance or
the diminution of the outputs; and
4.  To properly evaluate the asset base an charge for the consumption of capital22
5.  Conclusions
This paper  has argued  that  the information  can be and  should  used  to address  very
technical  issues  and  to  monitor  the  overall  performance  of  the  provider  of  privatised
infrastructure  services. But to reduce the risks of abusive behaviour,  the information generated
should also be used  to increase the accountability  of regulators and companies  alike. In Chile
for instance, the privatisation  of monopolies  did  lead to  significant gains  in efficiency but  it
took a long time  before even a portion of  these gains were passed on to the users.8 Neither the
firms nor the regulators  have  been held accountable for this situation  until recently when  the
Congress became  reluctant  to  endorse  a  new  wave  of privatisation  in  the  water  and  ports
sector, arguing  that  consumers  did  not  benefit  enough  from  earlier  waves  of infrastructure
privatisation.
More information  makes it easier  to scrutinise  regulatory  decisions  and  assessments
because it makes it easier to understand  who gains  and who loses from regulatory  decisions.
This in turn makes it easier to understand  the politics underlying  decisions and  the incentives
the various  players have to pull strings. More information  should then be used to increase the
transparency  of regulatory  decisions and  reduce  the risk of capture  of the regulators  by the
private  providers.  Ultimately,  what  this  paper  has  tried  to  show  is  that  more  transparent
decisions are not only possible--i.e. the tools exist-- but also desirable because they will mean
fairer and often more efficient decisions.
8  See Bitran, Estache, Guasch and Serra (1997)References
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